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Equilibrium Indeterminacy under
Forward-Looking Interest Rate Rules
Abstract
Why is the rational expectations equilibrium locally indeterminate if the central
bank raises the nominal interest rate too actively in response to a rise in expected
in°ation? This is because although the bank succeeds in stabilizing the expectations
of the future economy, it allows the current economy to arbitrarily °uctuate. This
indeterminacy expands in dimension as the forecast horizon of the rule becomes
long.
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1 Introduction
The literature has found that for the rational expectations equilibrium to be uniquely
determined, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate by more than
one-for-one in response to a rise in the current in°ation rate (i.e., the Taylor prin-
ciple). On the other hand, Bernanke and Woodford [3] argue that the bank should
follow the Taylor principle in response to the rate of expected in°ation but should
not raise the interest rate too actively. The reason for this is that the equilibrium
also becomes indeterminate under too active a forward-looking interest rate rule1.
Moreover, Batini and Haldane [1] argue that if the forecast horizon of the rule is
long, the forward-looking rule makes the economy °uctuating.
However, the related literature contains no work that explains the reason behind
the forward-looking rule making the equilibrium indeterminate, although it does
contain work in which the determinacy conditions on policy parameters have been
analytically derived. Considering the fact that the e®ects of monetary policy are
inclined to have a lag, it is essential that the central bank formulate a policy rule
that is endowed with the forward-looking perspective. In addition, it is necessary to
investigate the performance of a forward-looking rule with a long forecast horizon.
This paper presents two results. First, the emergence of indeterminacy under
an active forward-looking rule results from the fact that although the central bank
succeeds in stabilizing the expectations of the future economy, it allows the current
economy to arbitrarily °uctuate. Second, as the forecast horizon of the forward-
looking rule becomes long, there is an increase in the dimension of indeterminacy
that makes the economy more °uctuating.
The next section shows a basic NK model and the conditions for equilibrium de-
terminacy. Section 3 clari¯es the reason for the existence of indeterminacy through
1Similar arguments are o®ered by Clarida, Gali, Gertler [6] and Woodford [9, chapter 4].
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simple assumptions. Section 4 simulates the impulse responses of stable sunspot
equilibria that are possible under a forward-looking rule. The ¯nal section contains
the main results.
2 The Model
We use a basic NK model to obtain the conditions for the determinate rational
expectations equilibrium as described by Gali [5, chapter 3]2.
~yt = Et~yt+1 ¡ 1=¾ (it ¡ Et¼t+1) ; (1)
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ·~yt; (2)
it = ÁEt¼t+1 + "t: (3)
~yt denotes the output gap from its natural level in period t, ¼t is the rate of in°ation,
and it is the nominal interest rate. E is the expectation operator. The last equation
describes a forward-looking nominal interest rate rule where Á > 0 is the policy
parameter that represents the magnitude of the central bank's response to expected
in°ation. "t is a single exogenous fundamental shock that satis¯es Et¡1"t = 0 for
all t. ¾ > 0, 0 < ¯ < 1, · > 0 are parameters.
Gali [5, chapter 4] provides the following su±cient and necessary condition for
determinacy:
1 < Á < ¹Á;
where ¹Á ´ 1 + 2¾(1+¯)
·
. This condition suggests that in addition to following the
Taylor principle (Á > 1), the central bank also should not raise the nominal interest
rate too actively in response to a rise in the rate of expected in°ation.
2Gali [5] introduces the natural rate rnt in (1) and the steady state nominal interest rate ½ in
(3). We assume rnt = ½ = 0 to simplify the analysis. However, our analysis is unchanged.
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3 Mechanism of Indeterminacy
To establish theoretical reasons for the indeterminacy that appears under a forward-
looking rule, we consider equilibrium solutions under an active rule Á = +1 as a
simple case.
3.1 Under an active rule
Proposition 1 For any value of fundamental shock " in period t, if Á = +1
under (3), the current equilibrium is indeterminate while the future equilibria are
determinate as ½
¼t = ·~yt = ¡·¾ it;
Et¼t+j = Et~yt+j = Etit+j = 0 for j ¸ 1: (4)
(The proof is in Appendix A.)
This indeterminacy stems from the characteristic of the forward-looking rule.
This rule implies that the central bank primarily focuses on stabilizing the ex-
pectations of future variables. Then, to the extent that a forward-looking rule is
active, the bank allows the current economy to arbitrarily °uctuate while satisfying
(4). As a result, the too active forward-looking rule makes the current equilibrium
indeterminate3.
This result gives contrast to the equilibrium dynamics under a current-looking
rule it = Á¼t instead of (3). Under the same assumptions in Proposition 1, the
stable equilibrium is uniquely determined as
Et¼t+j = Et~yt+j = Etit+j = 0 for 8j:
The derivation is in Appendix B.
3This characteristic resembles one of that of a passive rule (Á < 1) in that the response of the
bank to the °uctuations in the current variables is weak.
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The current-looking rule di®ers from Proposition 1 in that it makes the current
equilibrium determinate. This is because the central bank always focuses on stabi-
lizing variables in the same period. Then the current economy as well as the future
economy is uniquely determined only if Á > 1.
As our simulations will show later, the mechanism shown in Proposition 1 works
under the forward-looking rule of ¹Á < Á < +1 in general.
3.2 A long forecast horizon
The implication of Proposition 1 can be applied toward understanding the economy
in which the central bank responds to the expected in°ation of a long forecast
horizon. As a simple example, we consider the following rule instead of (3):
it = ÁEt¼t+2 + "t: (5)
Lemma 1 For any value of fundamental shock " in period t, if Á = +1 under
(5), the equilibrium solution has a two-dimensional indeterminacy. (The proof is
in Appendix C.)
The intuition is similar. Under this rule, the central bank gives top priority to
stabilizing the expectations of the future variables from period t+2 onward. Then,
to the extent that a forward-looking rule is active, the bank allows the current
economy and that of the next period to arbitrarily °uctuate. This leads to a two-
dimensional indeterminacy.
Lemma 1 is easily generalized as follows.
Proposition 2 For any value of fundamental shock " in period t, if Á = 1
under it = ÁEt¼t+j for j ¸ 0, the equilibrium solution has j-dimensional indeter-
minacy. (The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1.)
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Batini and Haldane [1] argue that an in°ation forecast rule with a long forecast
horizon risks macroeconomic instability. However, their model is a reduced-form
model, and thus, they do not provide any theoretical reason for the instability.
Proposition 2 suggests that the instability is ampli¯ed by the increase in the di-
mension of indeterminacy.
4 Simulation
We simulate stable sunspot equilibrium dynamics to show that the °uctuations
in the current variables are ampli¯ed to the extent that the central bank makes
it active to respond to expected in°ation. The values of our parameters are taken
from Gali [5, p.51]: ¾ = 1, · = 0:1275, ¯ = 0:99, and then ¹Á ¼ 32:2157. In response
to a sunspot shock in period 0 that generates a 0:1% rise in the expected in°ation
rate in period t + 1, we simulate sunspot dynamics under Á = f32:5; 40; 50g. This
sunspot shock abstracts a situation in which, for example, households happen to
expect expansions of the future economy. The methodology applied to calculate
sunspot equilibria is taken from Sims [8] and Lubik and Schorfheide [7]4.
Figure 1 shows the sunspot impulse responses. By assumption, the sunspot
shock always raises the in°ation rate in period t + 1 by 0:1%. Sunspot equilibria
under Á > ¹Á are oscillatory and converging to the steady state. The oscillatory
convergence under Á > ¹Á originates from the fact that in response to an increase
in expected in°ation above the steady state, the bank raises the current nominal
rate so actively that the current variables drop below the steady state. Thus, the
variables in the current and next periods continue to have signs opposite to each
4Sims [8] generalizes the methodology of Blanchard and Kahn [4] to obtain a solution of the
rational expectations equilibrium. Lubik and Schorfheide [7] show a methodology to obtain the
impulse responses of a sunspot equilibrium using Sims' methodology. The details are in Appendix
D.
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other around the steady state56.
The magnitude of Á has a positive e®ect on the future economy and a negative
one on the current economy. As Á becomes large, future variables get stabilized
while current variables °uctuate. This is in keeping with the implication of Propo-
sition 1 in that the central bank succeeds in stabilizing the future economy on the
one hand and leaves the current economy to arbitrarily °uctuate on the other7.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the reason for the equilibrium being indetermi-
nate when a forward-looking rule is too active. We also consider the reason for the
economic instability when the forecast horizon of the rule becomes long.
The reason for the former is that if an active forward-looking rule is adopted,
the central bank primarily focuses on stabilizing the expectations of future variables
on the one hand and allows the current variables to arbitrarily °uctuate due to a
sunspot shock on the other. The reason for the lattrer is that indeterminacy expands
in dimension as the central bank focuses on stabilizing the expectations of in°ation
in the distant future.
5This mechanism is inherently equivalent to that of the sunspot equilibria under Á < 1 that
smoothly converge to the steady state, as simulated by Lubik and Schorfheide [7]. The smooth
convergence under Á < 1 is due to the fact that in response to a rise in the expected in°ation,
the central bank raises the current nominal rate less than one-for-one. Then, the positive sunspot
shock in the expected in°ation reduces the real interest rate, and the economy is modestly adjusted
toward the steady state.
6If Á reaches unity or ¹Á, sunspot responses stop converging. The equilibrium solutions are
shown in Appendix E and F, respectively. If Á exceeds these values, the sunspot responses explode,
leaving only fundamental responses in the neighborhood of the steady state.
7Note that this oscillatory dynamic is di®erent from the limit cycle found by Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe [2]. They show the possibility of global indeterminacy under a backward-looking
rule.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose Á = +1. For any value of fundamental shock " in period t, (3) leads to
Et¼t+1 = 0. This is applied to the expectations in period t+ 1 onward. Then,
Et¼t+j = 0 for j ¸ 1: (6)
(2) and (6) derive ¼t = ·~yt. This is applied to the expectations in period t + 1
onward. Then, from (6),
Et~yt+j =
½
¼t=· for j = 0
0 for j ¸ 1 : (7)
In addition, (1), (6), and (7) provide
Etit+j =
½ ¡¾~yt for j = 0
0 for j ¸ 1 :
it has an arbitrary value due to a sunspot shock in period t that is irrespective of
fundamental shock ".
To summarize, for any value of fundamental shock " in period t, if Á =1 under
a forward-looking rule it = ÁEt¼t+1, the equilibrium is½
¼t = ·~yt = ¡·¾ it;
Et¼t+j = Et~yt+j = Etit+j = 0 for j ¸ 1:
B Equilibrium under it =1 ¢ ¼t
Suppose Á = +1. For any value of " in period t, (3) leads to
Et¼t+j = 0 for 8j: (8)
Next, (2) and (8) provide
Etyt+j = 0 for 8j: (9)
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However, if the economy satis¯es (8) and (9), (1) indicates that the nominal
interest rate must satisfy
Etit+j = 0 for 8j:
In summary, for any value of fundamental shock " in period t, if Á = 1 under
a current-looking rule it = Á¼t, the equilibrium is
Et¼t+j = Et~yt+j = Etit+j = 0 for 8j:
C Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose Á = +1. For any value of fundamental shock " in period t, (5) leads to
Et¼t+2 = 0. This is applied to the expectations in period t+ 2 onward. Then,
Et¼t+j = 0 for j ¸ 2: (10)
(2) and (10) give Et¼t+1 = ·Et~yt+1. This is applied to the expectations in period
t+ 2 onward. Then, from (10),
Et~yt+j =
½
Et¼t+1=· for j = 1
0 for j ¸ 2 : (11)
In addition, (1), (10), and (11) provide
Etit+j =
½ ¡¾Et~yt+1 for j = 1
0 for j ¸ 2 :
Summarizing the solutions from period t+1 onward, for any value of fundamental
shock " in period t, if Á =1 under it = ÁEt¼t+2, the equilibrium is½
Et¼t+1 = ·Et~yt+1 = ¡·¾Etit+1;
Et¼t+j = Et~yt+j = Etit+j = 0 for j ¸ 2:
Etit+1 has an arbitrary value due to a sunspot shock in period t that is irrespective
of fundamental shock ". This means that the equilibrium solution in period t + 1
has a one-dimensional indeterminacy.
9
Further, given the value of Et~yt+1, the solution in period t is expressed as func-
tions of it as
½
¼t = ·
¡
1 + ¯ + ·
¾
¢
Et~yt+1 ¡ ·¾ it;
~yt =
¡
1 + ·
¾
¢
Et~yt+1 ¡ 1¾ it:
it also has an arbitrary value due to another sunspot shock in period t that is
irrespective of fundamental shock ". That is, the solution in period t has greater
one-dimensional indeterminacy even if Et~yt+1 is given.
Therefore, for any value of fundamental shock " in period t, if Á = 1 under
it = ÁEt¼t+2, the equilibrium has a two-dimensional indeterminacy.
D Derivation of a Sunspot Equilibrium
Our system is described in the manner employed by Sims [8] as follows:
¡0Yt = ¡1Yt¡1 +ªzt +¦´t;
where Yt =
2664
~yt
¼t
Et~yt+1
Et¼t+1
3775 ; zt = "t; ´t = · ´yt´¼t
¸
;
¡0 =
2664
1 0 ¡1 (Á¡ 1) =¾
¡· 1 0 ¡¯
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
3775 ;¡1 =
2664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
3775 ;ª =
2664
¡1=¾
0
0
0
3775 ;¦ =
2664
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
3775 ;
where ´xt represents the forecast error of variable x (that is, xt = Et¡1xt + ´
x
t ).
A solution to a fundamental equilibrium under determinacy is given through
equation (44) of Sims [8], and this solution corresponds to the solution of a fun-
damental equilibrium under indeterminacy that Lubik and Schorfheide [7] de¯ne
under the assumption of Orthogonality. A solution to a sunspot equilibrium un-
der indeterminacy is the sum of the above fundamental solution and a forecast
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error component H
·
Q1: ¡ ©Q2:
0
¸
¦´t, notations of which are taken from Sims
[8]. These solutions are computed using a MATLAB program "gensys.m," which is
given in Professor Sims' homepage.
E Equilibrium under it = Et¼t+1
Suppose that a sunspot shock causes households to believe that the in°ation rate is
non-zero and permanently constant; for example, Et¼t+j = ¼ 6= 0 for j ¸ 0. Then,
if Á = 1, the following smooth and non-converging sunspot equilibrium satis¯es our
equations:
Et¼t+j = ¼;
Et~yt+j =
1¡ ¯
·
¼;
Etit+j = ¼ for j ¸ 0:
F Equilibrium under it = ¹ÁEt¼t+1
Suppose that a sunspot shock causes households to believe that the absolutes of
variables are non-zero and constant and that the signs of variables change period
by period; for example, Et¼t+j = (¡1)j ¼ 6= 0 for j ¸ 0. Then, if Á = ¹Á =
1 + 2¾(1+¯)
·
, the following cyclical and non-converging sunspot equilibrium satis¯es
our equations:
¼t+j = (¡1)j ¼;
~yt+j = (¡1)j 1 + ¯
·
¼;
it+j = (¡1)j
µ
1 +
2¾ (1 + ¯)
·
¶
¼ for j ¸ 0:
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Figure 1   Impulse Responses to a Sunspot Shock
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